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1. Introduction
In book seven of the Nicomachean ethics,1 Aristotle takes up the chal­
lenge presented by Socrates in the Protagoras, namely that “no man volun­
tarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil”2 (358c­d). This is, in 
fact, a very typical way of proceeding for Aristotle starting with common 
 1 All citations from the Nicomachean ethics are from the Martin Ostwald translation.
 2 All citations from the Protagoras are from The collected dialogues of Plato, ed. B. Jowett, 
Charlottesville 1993.
Timothy Hynes is a seminarian studying for 
the Archdiocese of Boston. He holds bache­
lor of arts degrees in philosophy and com­
puter science from Assumption College in 
Worcester, Massachusetts. Prior to entering 
seminary he spent time working as a software 
engineer, punctuated by a short two year hia­
tus as a Catholic missionary in Lima, Perú 
with the French ecclesial movement Points-
Cœur. He is currently pursuing a master’s 
degree in philosophy from Boston College 
in addition to master’s degrees of divinity 
& theology at St. John’s Seminary in Boston, 
Massachusetts.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/lie.1914
56 Timothy Hynes
opinion (ἔνδοξα) followed by an examination of opposing claims. In this 
way, his aim in book seven is to examine the commonly held opinion 
that men can and do act against what they know to be best. This essay 
will continue that task along with Aristotle, reviewing some of the ap­
proaches that various Aristotelian interpreters have taken in an attempt 
to more clearly appreciate the problem of ἀκρασία as it occurs in the 
Nicomachean ethics. With this in mind, it will emphasize the role of desire 
both in terms of deliberation as well as in action with regard to the be­
havior of the ἀκρατής, making the argument that it is desire which causes 
him to abandon what he reasons to be the proper conduct for a given 
situation. To this end, this essay will begin with a summary look at the 
problem and resolution as presented by Aristotle. Next, it will review in 
detail Aristotle’s example syllogism, taking each of the premises in turn, 
arguing that desire functions as both universal and particular premises. 
It will then turn to the “three elements in the soul which control action 
and truth,” looking at the relationship between appetite and intellect in 
order to more clearly present the factors that move a soul to act. Lastly, 
it will conclude by arguing that it is the desire (or lack thereof) associ­
ated with virtuous behavior that leads one to become either the ἀκρατής 
or the ἐνκρατής.
2. Defining the problem
To begin, it can be seen that after listing some common opinions 
concerning the morally weak man3 in Book VII of Nicomachean ethics, 
Aristotle then turns to the crux of the problem, pointing out that “[while 
Socrates] claimed that no one acts contrary to what is best in the convic­
tion that what he is doing is bad, but through ignorance of the fact that it is 
bad, … [this] theory is plainly at variance with the observed facts. [Thus] 
one ought to investigate the emotion involved in the acts of the morally 
weak man… for evidently a man who is morally weak in his actions does 
 3 Following Ostwald, I will occasionally translate άκρατἠς as “morally weak man”, ἀκρασία 
as “moral weakness”, and ένκρατής as “morally strong.”
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not think that he ought to act the way he does before he is in the grip of 
emotion” (1145b27­30). Here, in contrast with the claims of Socrates, 
Aristotle makes it clear that he believed the emotions (i.e. the passions) 
to have some capacity to corrupt or prevent a man from acting on the 
conclusions of his deliberation. Correspondingly, he sets himself against 
Socrates’ argument, implying that it is possible for a man to fail to stand 
by the conclusions of his deliberation not through any fault of ignorance 
or reasoning, as Socrates might claim, but rather because such a man’s 
passions have impeded him from taking the course of action as dictated 
by reason. This raises for Aristotle the important question of how, or in 
what way, the emotions are involved in the deliberative process that re­
sults in action. For Socrates, the question is simply non­sensical; there is 
no way in which the emotions could possibly affect reason’s capacity to 
deduce the proper action in a given circumstance. Were this possible, it 
would imply that reason could be dragged about like a slave to the pas­
sions, as Plato writes in The Protagoras (352b). Consequently, Socrates 
proposes that it is not the emotions which affect a man’s judgement, but 
rather a lack of knowledge concerning what is best. Nevertheless, Aristotle 
writes that “this is plainly at variance with the observed facts” and there­
fore demands some explanation.
In order to resolve this apparent paradox, two solutions may be pro­
posed: (1) affirm the claim that the ἀκρατής does not truly know what 
is best but only appears to know (more or less the Socratic position) or 
(2) explain how a man can fail to act on his knowledge of what is best. It 
should be no surprise that Aristotle attempts to address both of these po­
sitions in the Nicomachean ethics, beginning in VII.3, where he dismisses 
the idea that the failure of the ἀκρατής is due to the relative strength of 
his knowledge: “Accordingly, if we are going to say that the weakness of 
their belief is the reason why those who hold opinion will be more liable 
to act against their conviction than those who have knowledge, we shall 
find that there is no difference between knowledge and opinion. For 
some people are no less firmly convinced of what they believe than oth­
ers are of what they know” (1146b27­30). In this way Aristotle immedi­
ately disqualifies the relative strength or weakness of one’s knowledge as 
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a possible source of akratic behavior in order to focus instead on the role 
of knowledge per se in deliberation and action.
To this end, he advances a theory of knowledge as understood in 
terms of potency and act, stating that “the verb to know has two mean­
ings: a man is said ‘to know’ both when he does not use the knowledge 
he has and when he does use it” (1146b31­34). Aristotle further quali­
fies this statement showing “that ‘having’ a characteristic has different 
meanings. There is a sense in which a person both has and does not 
have knowledge, for example, when he is asleep, mad or drunk. But this 
is precisely the condition of people who are in the grip of the emotions” 
(1147a11­15). Such a person is capable of “repeating geometrical dem­
onstrations and verses of Empedocles” (1147a19) but without any indi­
cation that this knowledge is of any use to them. That is, his knowledge 
cannot be put into practice and is nothing more than simple recitation. 
This implies a practical difference between the man whose knowledge is 
merely mimetic and the one who has internalized such knowledge and 
is consequently capable of applying it. An example of the former can be 
seen in the student of geometry who has memorized Euclid’s conclusion 
that “the three internal angles of every triangle taken together are equal 
to two right angles” but who has not internalized its significance.4 Such 
a student is neither capable of producing a proof for this knowledge nor 
is he able to apply it in further geometrical algorithms or demonstra­
tions. In contrast, the learned geometer is capable not only of recalling 
the dictum, but of applying it to particular concrete situations as well as 
giving a demonstration of its validity. For this reason, he may be said to 
have truly learned the meaning of the dictum unlike the student who has 
merely memorized a certain mathematical conclusion.
Like the student, the man in the “grip of the emotions” is also inca­
pable of making use of his knowledge. However, unlike the student, such 
a man must be capable of applying his knowledge to particular situations 
 4 See book 1, proposition 32 in Euclid, The first six books of the Elements of Euclid, in 
which coloured diagrams and symbols are used instead of letters for the greater ease of learners, transl. 
O. Byrne, London 1847, p. 33.
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because it is only in this way that may he be said to have knowledge as 
opposed to mere recollection. His knowledge must be the knowledge of 
the geometer, not the student. For this reason, Aristotle qualifies his defi­
nition of the problem, stating that “a man who is morally weak in his ac­
tions does not think that he ought to act the way he does before he is in 
the grip of emotion” (1145b29­30). Clearly, such a man must be capable 
of applying his knowledge if he is able to recognize that a particular situ­
ation calls for a certain response. One must suppose then that the mor­
ally weak man is capable of applying his knowledge when he is not over­
come by the passions (like the geometer), for if he cannot, then neither 
can he be said to know in any practically meaningful way (like the stu­
dent whose “knowledge” is nothing more than recollection). This means 
that the emotions are capable of preventing a man from making use of 
his internalized knowledge. Thus, even though he may be able to recall 
the universal premises of such knowledge (e.g. that “the three internal 
angles of every triangle taken together are equal to two right angles”), he 
is unable to apply it to any particulars (e.g. finding the angle of a vertex 
of a triangle when given the angles of its other two vertices).
Accordingly, the challenge for Aristotle will revolve around explaining 
both (1) where in the reasoning process such an incapacitation occurs 
as well as (2) why the passions have such an effect. In an effort to resolve 
these quandaries, Aristotle makes use of what is known as the practical 
syllogism, highlighting the interaction between the universal and partic­
ular premises and their role in the subject’s action. He writes that “in the 
practical syllogism one of the premises, the universal, is a current belief 
while the other involves particular facts which fall within the domain of 
sense perception. When two premises are combined into one, i.e. when 
the universal rule is realized in a particular case, the soul is thereupon 
bound to affirm the conclusion and if the premises involve action, the 
soul is bound to perform this act at once. For example, if the premises 
are: ‘Everything sweet ought to be tasted’ and ‘This thing before me is 
sweet’ (‘this thing’ perceived as an individual particular object), a man 
who is able to taste and is not prevented is bound to act accordingly at 
once” (1147a20­30). That is, the combination of the universal premise 
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“Everything sweet ought to be tasted” with the particular premise “This 
thing before me is sweet” ought to move the soul to the realization of the 
universal premise in the particular, concrete circumstances of a present 
and sweet thing.
In contrast with the previous example there then follows a second 
practical syllogism, again with both universal and particular premises, in 
which the subject (i.e. us) fails to abide by the demands of reason. “Now, 
suppose that there is within us one universal opinion forbidding us to 
taste things of this kind [sweet things], and another universal opinion 
which tells us that everything sweet is pleasant, and also a concrete per­
ception, determining our activity, that the particular thing before us is 
sweet; and suppose further that the appetite for pleasure happens to be 
present. The result is that one opinion tells us to avoid that thing, while 
appetite, capable as it is of setting in motion each part of our body, drives 
us to it. This is the case we have been looking for, the defeat of reason 
in moral weakness” (1147a31­37). This may be simplified as follows:5 
(a) Everything sweet is forbidden to be tasted; (b) Everything sweet is 
pleasant; (c) This thing before us is sweet; (d) This thing before us ought 
not to be tasted (conclusion drawn from (a) + (c)); (e) This thing before 
us is pleasant (conclusion drawn from (b) + (c)); (f) We desire pleasure; 
(g) We desire this thing before us (conclusion drawn from (e) + (f)). Now, 
since this syllogism is a bit complex, it will hel to examine each premise 
individually, working towards the final premise. The first, (a), is fairly 
straightforward and states a “universal opinion” (i.e. a universal prem­
ise). However, because it is universal, it cannot be the motivating force of 
action because it lacks any concrete particularity; that is, only “when the 
universal rule is realized in a particular case” will the soul be bound to 
action.6 Premise (b) is also universal and consequently cannot move the 
subject to action. Unlike (a) and (b), (c) is particular and thus potentially 
 5 For the sake of clarity, the conclusions of the syllogism are in italics.
 6 Aristotle also adds at 1147b9, “The final premise, consisting as it does in an opinion 
about an object perceived by the senses, determines our action.” Here, Aristotle is referring to the final 
premise (i.e. the conclusion) which involves particulars and so determines one’s action. Universals, 
which are abstract by nature, do not involve particulars and therefore cannot precipitate action.
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grounds for action. Aristotle calls this a “concrete perception, determin­
ing our activity” and so, as in the first example syllogism, the union of the 
universal and the particular compels us (viz., the subject of the second syl­
logism) to act. In the first syllogism, this union demands that the subject 
taste the thing before him. In this second syllogism, conclusion (d) (the 
union between premises (a) + (c)) ought to prevent us from tasting the 
thing before us.7 However, the union between (b) + (c), here referred as 
conclusion (e), makes it clear that the thing before us is pleasant. Now, if 
there were no other premises the corresponding action would be obvi­
ous: We ought not taste the thing before us. However, Aristotle adds that 
“the desire for pleasure happens to be present” which has been included 
as premise (f): “We desire pleasure.” This means that an additional con­
clusion can be drawn from the union of conclusion (e) + premise (f), 
stated explicitly as (g): “We desire this thing before us.”
Now, given the way in which the premises of the second syllogism 
have been parsed out, one may be inclined to treat premise (f) as either 
a universal or a particular. What it is in reality remains somewhat unclear, 
a point that will be discussed in the next section. Here, what is impor­
tant to note is that reason does not appear to be the only element within 
the soul capable of moving an individual to action. This may be inferred 
from Aristotle’s inclusion of the clause, “and suppose further that the ap­
petite for pleasure happens to be present… for appetite, capable as it is of 
setting in motion each part of our body, drives us to [the sweet thing]” 
(1147a30­35). It seems then that the practical syllogism alone is not suf­
ficient motivation for action and that something more must be added. 
With this in mind, B. J. Stoyles writes that “as Aristotle presents them in 
NE 7, each syllogism [is] composed of a rule indicating a moral obliga­
tion ([i.e. a universal such as] all men ought to…) and knowledge of the 
person’s particular situation ([i.e. a particular such as] I am in a situation 
 7 Because it is not obvious that the omission of an act is an act (i.e. not tasting the sweet 
thing), one might say that conclusion (d) moves the soul to avoid such circumstances that would 
compel it to taste the sweet thing. Thus, instead of moving towards something (e.g. the sweet thing), 
the soul would move away. In either case, the soul acts.
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to…). If this were all there is to practical reasoning, however, none of us 
would ever be moved to act, for intellect itself, Aristotle tells us, “moves 
nothing” (1139a37). On Aristotle’s view, only desire moves us to act. With 
this, he must have thought that practical reasoning only results in action 
when desire is somehow involved or attached to the process of reasoning 
represented by the practical syllogisms.”8 Nevertheless, as Stoyles points 
out in a subsequent footnote, this does not necessarily imply that the 
practical syllogism is incapable of initiating action but rather that desire 
is an integral part of the process leading to action.9 It appears to be for 
this reason that Aristotle adds the clause that indicates the presence of 
an appetite for pleasure. It is the contention of this essay that the inclu­
sion of this phrase is meant to implicate the active role that desire can 
and does play in the practical syllogism since, as Aristotle himself writes, 
“thought alone moves nothing; only thought which is directed to some 
end and concerned with action can do so” (1139a35).
How thought is directed to some end and concerned with action is 
made clear in Aristotle’s discussion of choice in book VI, where he clarifies 
the roles of thought and desire with regard to action, indicating the direct 
role of desire. “There are,” he writes, “three elements in the soul which 
control action and truth: sense perception, intelligence, and desire. Of 
these sense perception does not initiate any action”10 (1139a18­19). Now, 
while Aristotle explicitly denies that sense perception may initiate action, 
one may infer from its inclusion here that it plays some kind of role relat­
ed to action even if it is not an initiating one. Some indication of this has 
already been seen in the example syllogism where Aristotle adds “a con­
crete perception, determining our activity, that the particular thing before 
us is sweet.” Certainly, without such a perception no amount of thought 
 8 B.  J. Stoyles, Aristotle, akrasia, and the place of desire in moral reasoning, „Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice” 10 (2007), p. 203–204. Stoyles also remarks in a footnote that in De 
Anima 3.9 (433a), “we are told that mind is never found producing movement without some desire.)
 9 Cf. B. J. Stoyles, Aristotle, akrasia…, op. cit., p. 204, n. 29.
 10 In a footnote on this quote, Martin Ostwald explains that “throughout the Nic. Eth., 
Aristotle uses praxis (‘action’) as equivalent to ‘moral action,’ ‘conduct’” (Aristotle, Nicomachean eth-
ics, transl. M. Ostwald, Upper Saddle River, 1999, p. 145).
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(“intelligence”) or desire could move one to act. Even so, Aristotle states 
that sense perception alone is not responsible for initiating action. This 
leaves intelligence and desire as the only remaining candidates capable 
of moving the soul to act. However, the two are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and, in fact, may be seen to work in concert. “What affirmation 
and negation are in the realm of thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the 
realm of desire. Therefore, since moral virtue is a characteristic involving 
choice, and since choice is a deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice 
is to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire correct; that is, 
reasoning must affirm what desire pursues. This then is the kind of thought 
and the kind of truth that is practical and concerned with action… But 
in intellectual activity concerned with action, the good state is truth in 
harmony with correct desire” (1139a21­1139a30). Choice here seems to 
be concerned with both thought and desire, with the former ratifying the 
latter. Aristotle continues, writing that “choice is the starting point of ac­
tion: it is the source of motion but not the end for the sake of which we 
act, i.e. the final cause. The starting point of choice, however, is desire and 
reasoning directed toward some end… Now thought alone moves nothing; 
only thought which is directed to some end and concerned with action 
can do so. And it is this kind of thought also which initiates production. 
For whoever produces something produces it for an end. The product he 
makes is not an end in an unqualified sense, but an end only in a particu­
lar relation and of a particular operation. Only the goal of action is an end 
in the unqualified sense: for the good life is an end, and desire is directed 
toward this. Therefore, choice is either intelligence motivated by desire 
or desire operating through thought, and it is a combination of these two 
that man is a starting point of action”11 (1139a31­1139b5). “The starting 
point of action” (1139a31), is therefore “intelligence motivated by desire 
or desire operating through thought” (1139b4). In either case, it is desire 
which initiates the process towards action, with reason either affirming or 
denying the end which desires seeks. The question raised by the problem 
 11 For a more detailed treatment of choice and desire, see M. L. Rivera, Voluntad y akra-
sia, „Saga” 11 (2005).
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of ἀκρασία therefore is whether it is possible for reason to deny what de­
sire seeks and yet fail to prevent that desire from resulting in action.
3. Appetite, Reason, and Desire
In the second example syllogism above, what Aristotle discovers is 
that ἀκρασία is indeed possible insofar as two opposing conclusions are 
reached: (d) This thing before us ought not to be tasted; and (g) We de-
sire this thing before us. Thus, as Aristotle writes, “one opinion tells us to 
avoid that thing, while appetite, capable as it is of setting in motion each 
part of our body, drives us to it. This is the case we have been looking 
for, the defeat of reason in moral weakness” (1147a34­35). In this way, 
at least as far as Aristotle’s example syllogism represents a common ex­
perience, ἀκρασία is shown to be a reality. A man may know through 
the use of his reason which course of action he ought to take and yet fail 
to take it. Nevertheless, what is most interesting about this second syl­
logism is that the latter of the two conclusions is not arrived at through 
the sole use of reason. Desire also plays a role in determining one of the 
opposing conclusions, seemingly making use of reason in the process; 
for without having recognized conclusion (e) – drawn from the universal 
premise (b) and the particular premise (c) – conclusion (g) could never 
have been realized. Likewise, just as universal premises cannot motivate 
a subject to act, neither can a desire without an object or end since a desire 
is always directed towards something. That is, a desire without an object 
lacks the necessary particularity needed for its realization in the same 
way that a universal premise without relation to concrete circumstances 
(as perceived through the senses) cannot be realized. Accordingly, prem­
ise (f) functions like a universal premise and once it has been combined 
with the particular premise (e) compels the subject to act.
All this is possible, however, only if the divide between the appetitive 
part of the soul and the rational part is not quite as distinct as otherwise 
might be thought. Reason, along with sense perception, appears to provide 
appetite (i.e. the source of corporeal desires) with both particular prem­
ises it needs to satisfy its desire. Viz. reason unifies the universal premise 
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(b) Everything sweet is pleasant, with the particular premise provided by 
sense perception (c) This thing before us is sweet. Finally, reason concludes 
that (e) This thing before us is pleasant, itself a particular premise insofar 
as it regards a particular. Once this conclusion has been reached, appe­
tite then has everything it needs to satisfy its desire for pleasure since it 
is now possible to recognize that (g) We desire this thing before us.
Thus it seems that reason can be made to serve the interests of appetite 
to the extent that it is the former which recognizes which circumstances 
warrant which emotional responses. This seems dangerously close to ad­
mitting that reason may be dragged about like a slave by appetite, a con­
clusion which Socrates considers absurd. Nevertheless, it seems there is 
some kind of relationship between the two, however unclear it might be. 
Writing with a particular emphasis on the emotions (passions) as opposed 
to appetite, Nancy Sherman contends that Aristotle viewed the former as 
taking part in reason insofar as it “has cognitive content of its own.” She 
writes that “it is hard to dismiss the common sense view of things, here, 
that akratic ignorance is motivated – that recalcitrant interests can cause 
an all things considered judgment of what is best to be forgotten. That is, 
desire might still drag reason around by being the cause of its malfunc­
tion. Moreover, in the case of recalcitrant emotions as opposed to recal­
citrant appetites, Aristotle seems to think the emotions themselves allied 
in certain ways with reason. The point comes up in a difficult passage 
at Nicomachean ethics VII.6. Aristotle is talking about akratic anger and 
how its expression is less morally objectionable than acting on akratic 
appetites. The gist of his argument is that emotions, in general, involve 
a constitutive cognitive content and a kind of reasoning that is not as 
clearly part of the content of appetite. […] The implicit claim is that an 
emotion like anger, whether akratic or not, ‘partakes’ of reason in that it 
has cognitive content of its own. As we would put it, anger has as its rea­
son and cause the belief or construal that we have been insulted.”12 Now 
 12 N. Sherman, Is the ghost of Aristotle haunting Freud’s house?, [in:] Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. J. Cleary, G. M. Gurtler S. J., vol. 16, Boston 
2000, p. 65–66.
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while it is clear that Sherman’s emphasis is on the cognitive content of the 
emotions as opposed to the appetites, this essay argues that both neces­
sarily include at least some degree of reason in their function. However, 
the way in which the two involve reason appears to be inversely related. 
That is, with regard to anger, reason first ascertains that a particular situ­
ation justifies an angry emotional response and thus the corresponding 
emotion ensues. Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo and others refer to this as 
appraisal theory, which “describes the emotions as conscious states which 
are the consequence of a value judgment that requires the collaboration 
of specific rational faculties. In this way, every emotion is composed of 
a judgment in which the individual evaluates a given circumstance as 
worthy of compassion, shame, or anger.”13
In contrast, unlike the emotions, appetitive desire may be present 
without a particular existing object of desire, as is the case as presented 
by Aristotle in the second syllogism above where he writes that “the ap­
petite for pleasure happens to be present.”14 Nevertheless, reason, in co­
operation with sense perception, must determine that a particular, con­
crete object is capable of satisfying a desire. If either of the two fail in 
their own particular tasks or in working together to determine conclu­
sion (e) This thing before us is pleasant, appetitive desire would be inca­
pable of overcoming the proper dictates of reason since it would not be 
capable of realizing its ends insofar as it would not recognize the present 
object as able to satisfy its desire. Reason, both with regard to anger as 
 13 D. S. Garrocho Salcedo, La dimensión cognitiva de las pasiones : la vigencia de Aristóteles 
en la psicología moral contemporánea, „Éndoxa: Series Filosóficas” 31 (2013), p. 17–18. In the origi­
nal Spanish: “La teoría evaluativa (M. Arnold, R. Lazarus, N. Frijda) describe las emociones como 
estados de conciencia que son consecuencia de una estimación valorativa y que requieren, por ello, 
el concurso de disposiciones psíquicas específicamente racionales. De este modo, toda emoción que­
daría constituida por un juicio en el que el individuo evalúa una circunstancia dada como digna de 
compasión, vergüenza o ira.”
 14 It is entirely possible for an appetitive desire to arise through a corresponding aware­
ness that an object is desirable. This would be analogous to the case described by Sherman concern­
ing the emotions insofar as the desirable object gives rise the to the appetitive desire. For example, 
a glutton may not experience the desire for food until he finds himself face to face with a cherry 
cheesecake, which awakes his appetite.
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well as appetitive desire, must intervene through either the recognition 
that a particular situation calls for a certain impassioned response, or in 
acknowledgement that a particular object satisfies an existing appetitive 
desire. Accordingly, both the passions and appetitive desire require rea­
son for their proper functioning.
4. The role of desire in Ἀκρασία
Concerning the problem of ἀκρασία, the question raised at the end 
of the first section sought to determine whether it was possible for rea­
son to deny what desire seeks and yet fail to prevent that desire from re­
sulting in action. The second example syllogism seemed to confirm that 
it is indeed possible for a man to deliberate the correct course of action 
and yet, because of desire, be led to act against his reason. In the second 
section the argument was advanced that desire plays an integral role in 
the deliberative reasoning process analogous to a universal or particu­
lar premise, thus affecting the concomitant conclusions. This seemed to 
imply that there might be a way in which desire is capable of dragging 
reason around like a slave, which then lead to a closer examination of the 
interaction between the two. There, a relationship was shown in which 
desire provided some of the raw elements used in the syllogism (e.g. “the 
appetite for pleasure happens to be present”) which helped reason reach 
its conclusions. Correspondingly, insofar as choice is the starting point 
for action and the starting point for choice is “desire and reasoning di­
rected toward some end”, it appeared as though desire presents the ends 
to be pursued or avoided while reason ratifies them as good or bad.15
The problem of ἀκρασία, however, concerns the breakdown of this 
process in which reason rejects the goodness of a particular end while 
the soul is moved to act towards this end as a result of a present desire. 
Aristotle responds to this dilemma by arguing that the ἀκρατής acts like 
the man “asleep, mad, or drunk” inasmuch as he has knowledge, but that 
such knowledge is of no use to him. Again, like the student of geometry, 
 15 Cf. 1139a21­1139a30.
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the ἀκρατής may give the impression that he knows a particular moral 
maxim (e.g. “adultery is wrong”) and yet act against it because his de­
sires have rendered him unable to apply such knowledge to his particular 
situation. In this way, such a man may be said to “know” that certain ac­
tions are wrong while remaining ignorant of the fact that he is engaged 
in committing those very acts. John Cleary comments on this, assert­
ing that, “When [Aristotle] addresses the problem of akrasia in EN VII, 
however, he is just as puzzled as was Socrates on being confronted with 
the common phenomenon of people who know the right thing to do, 
yet still do the wrong thing. Although Aristotle finds it disturbing that 
reason can be dragged around like a slave by the passions, yet (unlike 
Socrates) he admits that something like this may be happening within 
akratic souls whose irrational desires are governing their actions. It is 
not unqualified ignorance that is responsible for this but rather some 
kind of qualified or temporary ignorance caused by the passions blind­
ing the rational part of the soul that normally governs actions within 
virtuous and self­controlled people.”16 Unlike the unqualified ignorance 
of the student of geometry who cannot apply his knowledge in any cir­
cumstance, the ἀκρατής is capable of applying his knowledge when he 
has not been overcome by his passions and unable to do so when he has. 
His ignorance must be qualified, therefore, with regard to the state of 
his passions and desires. Some, such as Devin Henry, refer to this kind 
of “qualified or temporary ignorance” as drunk ἀκρασία insofar as the 
knowledge of the ἀκρατής is of no use to him, like that of men “asleep, 
mad, or drunk.” This is in contrast with what he calls genuine ἀκρασία 
which occurs when the ἀκρατής knows not only that certain kinds of 
acts are wrong but that he is presently committing one of those acts. In 
no way, therefore, can the genuine ἀκρατής be said to be ignorant of what 
he does. Accordingly, Henry writes that “all forms of drunk­akrasia, 
then, can be accounted for in terms of an intellectual error, a failure to 
 16 Studies on Plato, Aristotle, and Proclus: collected essays on ancient philosophy of John 
J. Cleary, ed. by J. Dillon, B. O’Byrne, F. O’Rourke, Boston 2013, p. 131 [Ancient Mediterranean and 
Medieval Texts and Contexts, 15].
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deliberate correctly as the result of culpable ignorance induced by pas­
sion (1147a1­b18; cf. NE 3.5). However, the same cannot be said for the 
genuinely akratic man. This agent acts in the presence of full knowledge; 
he knows in the unqualified sense that what he does is wrong and yet 
does it anyway. This is what makes genuine akrasia such a hard problem: 
it is not an intellectual error. The genuinely akratic man is not ignorant 
of the fact that his desires are wrong when he makes his decision to act 
on them, and so his failure is not knowledge based”.17 As a result, an 
account of genuine ἀκρασία may make no appeal to a failure of reason 
in its explanation since no such error could have occurred by the very 
definition of the problem. That is, what separates drunk ἀκρασία from 
genuine ἀκρασία is that the former may be seen as a result of intellectual 
error while the latter cannot. In genuine ἀκρασία the ἀκρατής not only 
correctly deliberates which course of action he ought to take, but also 
knows in an unqualified way that he acts against what his reason dictates.
Why, then, does the genuine ἀκρατής fail to follow right reason? Henry 
believes that because both the ἐνκρατής and the ἀκρατής reason cor­
rectly with regard to how they ought to behave, the solution to the prob­
lem must be found where the two differ, namely, in the corresponding 
pleasures and pains that each feel according to their actions. In support 
of this theory, Henry cites a passage from Eudemian ethics II: “For the 
person of self­control [the ἐνκρατής] feels pain now in acting against his 
appetite, but has the pleasure of hope, i.e. the hope that he will be pres­
ently benefited [by abstaining], or even the pleasure of actually being at 
present benefited because he is healthy. On the other hand, the akrat­
ic man is pleased at securing through his akratic behaviour the object 
of his desire, but he has the pain of expectation, thinking that what he 
is doing is wrong” (1224b15­17).18 Henry argues that the presence of 
the “pain of expectation” in this passage indicates that Aristotle is writ­
ing here about the genuine ἀκρατής and not the drunk ἀκρατής. This 
 17 D. Henry, Aristotle on pleasure and the worst form of akrasia, „Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice” 5 (2002), p. 261.
 18 As translated in D. Henry, Aristotle on pleasure…, op. cit., p. 265.
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is because only the former whose reason is still functioning correctly is 
capable of recognizing that his present action is wrong and therefore ul­
timately harmful to him. Accordingly, while the drunk ἀκρατής and the 
ἐνκρατής differ in terms of their deliberative capacity (the former hav­
ing become “temporarily ignorant”), there is no difference between the 
ἐνκρατής and the ἀκρατής in terms of their rational functioning when 
they act. Instead, what sets the two apart are the objects of their corre­
sponding pleasure and pain. The former experiences the pleasure of vir­
tuous activity insofar as he knows he will benefit from such action while 
the latter experiences the pleasure of appetite.19 On the one hand, what 
enables the ἐνκρατής to follow the course of action ratified by reason is 
the pleasure and corresponding desire for virtuous action. On the other 
hand, what prevents the ἀκρατής from following suit is his lack of desire 
for the virtue of temperance.
Hence the key to understanding genuine ἀκρασία lies precisely in the 
presence or absence of these pleasures and their corresponding desires: 
for the ἐνκρατής, it is the desire for the pleasures of being temperate 
whereas for the ἀκρατής it is the desire for corporeal pleasure. Because 
the ἀκρατής lacks the desire for the pleasures of a temperate lifestyle, he 
fails to follow what right reason has shown him to be to his best advantage 
(i.e. living the virtuous life). Therefore, “the reason the genuinely akratic 
man acts as he knows he should not is that he is not prevented from fol­
lowing his appetite by an internal conflict that the desire for the proper 
pleasure of temperance would create if he could experience it. In other 
words […] because he does not experience an emotional pull towards the 
activity of temperance there is no opposing force to restrain him. This, 
then, is why after deliberating the genuinely akratic man fails to stand by 
his deliberation.”20 Knowing how one ought to act (i.e. practical wisdom) 
is therefore only half of what one needs to live virtuously. One must also 
have the corresponding desire to live virtuously, which includes finding 
 19 For simplicity, I will ignore Henry’s treatment of pain since it is inconsequential to his 
overall argument.
 20 D. Henry, Aristotle on pleasure…, op. cit., p. 266.
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pleasure in virtue, for as was noted earlier, “if the choice is to be good, 
the reasoning must be true and the desire correct.”
With Henry’s theory in view, the role played by desire in the prac­
tical syllogism becomes more discrete with the presence or absence of 
a particular desire as a key factor in the final premise. As already dis­
cussed, Aristotle’s inclusion of the clause “and suppose further that the 
appetite for pleasure happens to be present” gives some indication of 
the importance of desire in the conclusion of the syllogism. Examining 
the interaction between reason and desire makes it clear, then, that the 
two must work hand­in­glove in order to move the soul to act. Henry’s 
analysis of the pleasures of the ἐνκρατής and ἀκρατής makes the role of 
desire in action even more explicit by noting the significance of its pres­
ence or absence in the corresponding deliberation and actions of both 
the former and latter.
To conclude, it can be said that while reason is undoubtedly neces­
sary for proper conduct, it must work in concert with desire in order to 
move the soul to act.21 To that end, Aristotle writes that “if the choice 
is to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire correct; that is, 
reasoning must affirm what desire pursues.” Desire, then, produces the 
ends to which the soul is moved while reason ratifies those desires as ei­
ther good or bad. The case of ἀκρασία demonstrates, however, that the 
pleasures and pains associated with particular desires have the capac­
ity to enable or prevent one from following the dictates of right reason. 
Accordingly, the genuine ἀκρατής fails to abide by the conclusions of 
the practical syllogism because an “appetite for pleasure happens to be 
present” which produces its own, opposing conclusion. Therefore, while 
fully aware that his actions run counter to his deliberations, the genuine 
ἀκρατής nevertheless follows the conclusion reached as a consequence 
of his present appetite for pleasure. Correspondingly, it is only in culti­
vating the desire for the pleasures of virtue, “to like and to dislike what 
 21 Aristotle writes in De Anima, [in:] Aristotle: the complete works. Electronic edition, ed. 
by J. Barnes, Charlottesville 1992: “these two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appe­
tite and thought” (433a13).
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one should” (1172a22), that he can generate enough opposing force to his 
corporal desires, follow right reason, and be motivated to proper conduct.
Thus, in the final analysis, both the drunken and the genuine ἀκρατής 
can be held responsible for their failure to abide by the deliberations of 
reason insofar as they have each failed to cultivate a desire for the good. 
This failure can be understood as a kind of inadequate education in de­
sire which leaves the ἀκρατής without the necessary desires function­
ing as universal premises in the practical syllogism which enable him to 
reach the emotional as well as rational conclusion to behave according 
to the deliberation of right reason. In this way, reason is crucial to the 
proper moral development of the person insofar as “virtue or excellence 
is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the 
mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such 
as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it” (1106b35­37). 
Accordingly, an education in virtue is one that develops both a ἕξις of 
mind and emotion, the former instructing and cultivating the proper 
disposition of the latter, both of which ultimately form the foundation 
of the intellectual and desiderative knowledge that serve as the universal 
premises of the practical syllogism. Therefore, to the extent that one is 
ignorant in either intellectual or desiderative knowledge, one will fail to 
do the right thing. However, only when one is ignorant of desiderative 
knowledge can it be said that one “knows” how he ought to behave and 
yet fails to do so. Finally, to the extent that a man’s desire forms an inte­
gral part of the premises of practical syllogism, Aristotle can agree with 
Socrates in maintaining that seemingly paradoxical claim that “no man 
voluntarily pursues evil.”
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